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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RALPH D. SLATER, dba
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS
SERYICE,

Appellatnt,
Case No.
7222

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, and L. C. CROWTHER, as
Chief of Police of Salt Lake City, Utah,

Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal is taken from an order of the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sustaining respondents' demurrer to and dismissing appellants' complaint, which complaint is set forth in full
in appellant's brief on pages 2 to 12 thereof inclusive.
Appellant's complaint sought to restrain respondents from enforcing certain provisions of 'Section 3652
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944,
against himself and his agents. The pertinent parts of
the said ordinance as it pertains to the case at bar reads
as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to peddle
or offer for sale, barter or exchange at retail, any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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garden or farm produce, fruits, butter, eggs,
poultry, fish, game, or any other goods, wares
or merchandise whatsoever, or any tickets, coupons or receipts representing value or redeemable
in service, photographs, works of art, magazine
subscriptions, goods or merchandise whatsoever,
in, upon or along any street in Salt Lake City
without first obtaining a license so to do.
It shall be unlawful for any person, under
any circumstances, to peddle, sell or offer for
sale any magazine subscriptions, goods, wares or
merchandise whatsoever, in, upon or along any
of the following streets, to-wit:
South Temple street from Second East street
to First West Street ; First South street from
Second East street to First West street; Second
South street from Second East street to First
West street; Third South street from Second
East Street to First West street; Fourth South
street from Second East street to First West
street; State Street from First North street to
Fifth South street; Main Street from First North
street to Fifth South street; and no license shall
be granted to any person to peddle in, upon or
along the said streets above described.''
Appellant contends that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to and ordering the dismissal of his
complaint substantially for the reason that Section 3652
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944,
is:
An enfringement on the right of freedom of
speech and of the press.
1.

2.

A burden upon inter-state commerce.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
3.

Yoid because of discrimination.

And for the further reason that respondents were
discriininatory in enforcing the provisions of said ordinance.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT

It is respondents' position that appellant did not
set forth facts sufficient in his complaint on file herein
to warrant the trial court granting the relief therein
prayed for and that the trial court was justified
in entering its order sustaining respondents' demurrer
and ordering the dismissal of appellant's complaint.
This appeal is on the judgment roll only. However, the
trial court did prepare and file a memorandum decision
which is a part of this judgment roll.
Respondents in advancing their position in the foregoing matter and in answer to appellant's brief heretofore filed with your Honorable Court herein sets forth
their argument under five points, ,each of which will be
set forth separately as follows:
POINTS TO BE ARGUED

I. THE CITY HAS POWER AND THE DUTY
TO ENACT ORDINANCES REGULATING SALES
ON ITS HIGHWAYS AND SIDEWALKS.
II. THE RESTRICTION BY THE CITY ORDINANCE OF SALES IN A CONGESTED BUSINESS
AREA IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS.
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III. THE RESTRICTION OF A CERTAIN
AREA FROM THE BUSINESS OF THE SALE OF
MAGAZINES FOR PRIVATE GAIN IS NOT A BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
IV. SECTION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, IS
NOT VOID FOR WANT OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION OR PROPER AND LAWFUL CLASSIFICATION.
V. THE MERE LAX ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, BY RESPONDENTS
IS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN
A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE.
ARGUMENT

I. THE CITY HAS POWER AND THE DUTY
TO ENACT ORDINANCES REGULATING SALES
ON ITS HIGHWAYS AND SIDEWALKS.
The State of Utah has del ega ted to cities the power
to regulate sales and the movement of pedestrians on
its streets and sidewalks. Some of these grants by the
state to cities are as follows:

"15-8-29. TRAFFICKING IN STREETS.
They may regulate merchandising and sales upon
the streets, sidewalks and public places.'' U.C.A.
1943.
"15-8-30. REGULATION OF TRAFFIC.
They may regulate the movement of traffic on the
streets, sidewalks and public places, including the
movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles,
and the cars and engines of railroads, street rail-
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roads and tramways, and may prevent racing and
immoderate driving or riding.'' U.C.A. 1943.
'' 15-8-11. STREETS-ENCROACHMENTS,
LIGHTING, SPRINKLING, CLEANING. They
Inay regulate the use of streets, alleys, avenues,
sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and public grounds,
prevent and remove obstructions and encroachments thereon, and provide for the lighting,
sprinkling and cleaning of the same.'' U. C.A.
1943.
"15-8-23. C LEA N IN G PROPERTY,
STREETS AND SIDEWALKS. They may regulate and control the use of sidewalks and all structures thereunder or thereover; and they may require the owner or occupant, or the agent of any
owner or occupant, of property to remove all
weeds and noxious vegetation from such property,
and in front thereof to the curb line of the street,
and to keep the sidewalks in front of such property free from litter, snow, ice and obstructions."
U.C.A. 1943.
'' 15-8-39. LICENSE OF CERTAIN BUSINESSES. They may license, tax and regulate
hawking and peddling, etc. * * * U.C.A. 1943.
"15-8-80. LICENSE FEES AND TAXES.
They may raise revenue by levying and collecting
a license fee or tax on any business within the
limits of the city, and regulate the same by ordinance, etc." U.C.A. 1943.
''15-8-84. ORDINANCES-PUNISH11:ENT.
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such
as are necessary and proper to provide for the
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safety and preserve the health, and promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good
order, comfort and convenients of the city and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein; etc.'' U.C.A. 1943.
It is evident from the foregoing grants of power
that cities have the power to adopt ordinances tending
to promote the general welfare of the public and the
use of its streets and sidewalks and the right to regulate
the business of sales for personal gain upon its streets
and sidewalks and public places. These powers ipso
facto carry with them the authority not only to impose
reasonable restrictions and regulations but even the
power to suppress sales thereon. People vs. Thomvp~Son,
173 N. E.137.
In the case of Wade v. City arn.d Oounty of Swn
Francisco, 186 Pac. 2d, 181, the court said "that an ordinance prohibiting solicitation on any public street or
highway or in any area or doorway or entrance immediately abutting thereon of magazine subscriptions for
future delivery is prima facie constitutional.''
It is the duty of the city to maintain its streets in
such condition that the public should at all times have
the unobstructed use thereof. People v. Corn Products
Bejinimg Co., 121 N. E. 574.
The city holds title to our public streets in trust for
the use and benefit of the public and the public is ,entitled to use such streets free of obstructions. City of
Chicag(o v. McKitnley, 176 N. E. 261.
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II. THE RESTRICTION BY THE CITY ORDI1\AXCE OF SALES IN A CONGESTED BUSINESS
AREA IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON THE
RIGHT OF FREEDO:JI OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS.
The respondents have no quarrel with the statement
made by appellant that ''the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the
press have been secured by the constitutions of the
United States and of the State of Utah.''
The United States Supreme Court has ruled many
times upon questions involving these provisions in the
constitutions. Appellant relies in his brief upon the
decisions handed down in the case of Schtneider v. lrvitngton, 308 U. S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155, and also recite in
support of his position the cases of Lovell v. City iof
Griffin, 303 U. 'S. 444, and H·ague v. 0. I. 0., 307 U. S.
496, 83 L. Ed. 1423.
These are all cases where religion or a private controversy were being aired publicly by the distribution of
leaflets or printed mater and where ordinances were in
force that required the obtaining of a permit before any
such printed matter could be distributed, or where there
were provisions to the effect that such leaflets could not
be thrown upon the public streets or where the chief of
police was delegated unlimited discretion to determine
who might or who might not distribute such printed
matter.
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The cases are well settled that where a question of
religion or a private controversy are being presented
by printed or spoken word the same may be distributed
or spoken in all public places including streets and sidewalks, subject only to any and all reasonable regulations
by the local authorities.
The cases are also unanimously in accord that no
person has .any inherent right to conduct or carry on a
private business for his personal gain in a public street
and that such private business for gain is at all times
subject to local regulation or complete suppression dependent upon the local needs or requirements. This also
extends to the selling of magazines or other printed matter upon a public street as a matter of private gain or
business.
There can be no doubt from the allegations of appellant's complaint that he was engaging in business for
private gain on the public streets of Salt Lake City for
paragraphs 8, 9 and 15 of plaintiff's complaint provide
in part as follows:
'' 8. Plaintiff now is and has been, engaged
on the public streets and sidewalks in said Salt
Lake City, and in areas, doorways and entranceways immediately abutting thereon, in the business of soliciting and selling, in a quiet, dignified
and peaceful manner, without pressure or undue
influence, by and through agents and employees
employed by him for the purpose of selling, to
persons on said places, subscriptions to the magazines and periodicals aforesaid, for future delivery, and ·likewise the sale of tangible personal
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property to be delivered to the purchasers thereof, or to some other person, at a subsequent time.''
"9. • • • in said Salt Lake City, the defendants herein, acting by and through police officers
of the defendant municipality, and for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from so soliciting,
by and through his agents and employees, sales of
such subscriptions and sales of such tangible personal property, arrested certain of plaintiff's said
agents and employees for alleged violations of
said ordinance, * * * continue to prevent, plaintiff from carrying on in the manner aforesaid his
said business in said Salt Lake City, all to plaintiff's great pecuniary damage and irreparable
loss.''
'' 15. The defendants will, unless restrained
by this court, enforce the said ordinance against
plaintiff and his said agents and representatives
and will thereby injure and destroy the plaintiff's
said property and property rights, and cause
them material and irreparable loss, and plaintiff will be unable to conduct their said business
in Salt Lake City. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, many thousands of dollars. The value of the right of plaintiff to carry on his said business, free from the
harrassing and unlawful acts threatened by defendants as alleged hereinbefore, exceeds many
thousands of dollars. ''
In the case of Schn;ei,der v. I rvingbon, sup,ra, the
court said at page 163, where referring to the ordinance
then under attack:
"The ordinance is not limited to those who
canvass for private profit; nor is it merely the
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common type of ordinance requiring some form of
registration or license of hawkers or peddlers. It
is not a general ordinance to prohibit trespassing.
It bans unlicensed communication of any views
or the advocacy of any cause from door to door,
and permits canvassing only subject to the power
of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what
literature may be distributed from house to house
and who may distribute it.''
The same court further on page 165 states :
"We are not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinances requires.''
The latest United States Supreme Court case decided on the question of freedom of the press and freedom of speech is perhaps the case of Baia v. Pe1ovple,
decided on June 7, 1948, and reported in 68 Sup. Ct.
1148, a 5 to 4 decision in which the court held a city
ordinance void which permitted sound trucks to operate
in public places only if they first obtained a permit from
the chief of police, the court saying in part with reference to said ordinance that the said ordinance was void
for the reason that it provided for no standards prescribed for the exercise of the chief of police's discretion
and that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers or the
volume of sound to which they must be adjusted. The
Saia ease is a case involving the use of a sound truck
for religious purposes and even under such conditions
the court infers that an ordinance would be valid regu-
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lating· freed01n of speech and religion by controlling the
hours and the place of discussion permitted and the
an10un t of sound allowed.
On ~-\pril13, 1942, the United States Supreme Court
sustained an absolute prohibition of commercial advertising on city streets in the case of ralentine vs. Chresten.sen, 316 U. S. 3:2, 96 L. Ed. 1262. In that case a regulation of the City of New York prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills on the public streets. The
court upheld such measure as a valid exercise of the
city's police power, declaring that it did not interfere
with the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution; and stated:
''This court has unequivocally held that the
streets are proper places for the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states
and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets,
to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a
derogation of the public right of user, are matters
for legislative judgment. The question is not
whether the legislative body may interfere with
the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but
whether it must permit such pursuit by what it
deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference
with, the full and free use of the highways by the
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people in fulfillment of the public use to which
streets are dedicated. If the respondent was attempting to use the streets of New York by distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition
of the code provision was lawfully invoked against
his conduct.''
It should also be noted that the case of Valentine vs.
Chrestensen, supra, carne after the decisions of Oantwell
v. Oownecticut, 310 U.S. 305, 84 L. Ed. 1213, LoueU and
Hague cases supra. So, there is a clear indication that
the freedom of the press and speech guarantees of the
Constitution apply to non-commercial activities only.
The Supreme Court has also said in the case of
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 77 L. Ed. 288:
"It is well established law that the highways
of the State are public property-that their use
for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary,
which, generally, at least, the state may prohibit
or condition as it sees fit.''
In the case of City of Chioago v. Rhine, 2 N. E. 2d
905, a case directly in point, and in which case the selling of magazines as a business was prohibited in certain congested districts and an objection was raised
that the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of
the press was violated by such restriction, the court
said at page 909 :
''The defendant has not been deprived of
any supposed right freely to sell any magazines
which are written or published on any subject.
The ordinance has merely regula ted his business
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of BUlking ~ale~ on the ~treets in eertain restricted
regions in the city. His business has not been suppressed. The business of all others in a like situation and like business has been equally regulated.
Such regulation does not run against the grain of
the constitution. The ordinance does not prohibit
the sale nor the offering for sale of any magazines or any like publications in the city nor interfere with the circulation thereof." (Cites
cases)
III. THE RESTRICTION OF CERTAIN AREAS
FROi\I THE BUSINESS OF THE SALE OF MAGAZINES FOR PRIVATE .GAIN IS NOT A BURDEN
ON INTER-STATE COMMERCE.
Appellant in his brief under point II of his argument cites several cases holding that cities do not have
the power to license or tax inter-state commerce; nowhere in appellant's complaint does he allege that the
city did or attempted to exact a license or tax from him
for the privilege of engaging in any interstate business
or commerce. As a matter of fact Section 3722 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, as
amended, specifically exempts any persons engaging in
inter-stale business from procuring a license from the
city to so engage in such business. In the laS't paragraph
under point II of appellant's argument he says:
"In the case at bar the agent is pro:P,ibited
from soliciting business within a large section of
the city by this ordinance and therefore such restriction limits the free flow of business between
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the states and that area and is a burden upon interstate commerce.''
Under its police power a city has a right to make
reasonable regulations for the conduct of any business
for the purpose of promoting the peace, health and prosperity. of its citizens.
In the case of Town of Green Rive.r v. Bwnger, 58
Pac. 2d 456, which case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, in 300 U. S. 638, 81 L. Ed. 854,
a city ordinance provided that it was unlawful to make
a solicitation at any residence within the city for the
purpose of obtaining orders for the sale of goods, wares
and merchandise without first being invited by the occupant of such residence to make such solicitation. A
solicitor was arrested for such offense and the validity
of the ordinance was attacked on the grounds that it
was a burden on inter-state commerce by restricting the
places that could be solicited, but the court held the
ordinance valid, and stated at page 463 :
''We have in this case no question of the
exaction of a license fee or a tax. The ordinance
clearly is a local police regulation. We have decided that it has a real relation to the suitable
protection of people in their homes, and is reasonable in its requirements. If we are right in our
views as to the purpose and reasonableness of the
ordinance, it is valid, even though it may incidentally affect interstate commerce. Both federal courts that considered the ordinance were of
the same opinion on that question. Fuller Brush
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Co. Y. Town of Green River, 60 Fed. 613, and
Town of Green RiYer Y. Fuller Brush Co., 65
Fed. 2d 112. 88 A\.L.R. 177. The Circuit Court of
Appeals said: 'The ordinance does not purport
to interfere in any respect with the Fuller Brush
Company· s right or privilege of selling and transporting its ·wares in interstate commerce. It is
free to carry on a business of that sort except to
solicit orders in the manner specified in the ordinance, and obviously it could do so in many
"¥ays other than imposing itself upon and disturbing the residents of the town as prohibited by
the ordinance'."
In the case of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65
Fed. 2d 112, the court said :
''It has been uniformly held that while legislative authority may not arbitrarily interfere with
private affairs by imposing unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon a lawful business, yet a
considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded to the law making power, and if the regulation operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated and it is not shown that it is clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary, it cannot be judicially
declared to be in contravention of constitutional
right.
''This court has frequently affirmed that the
local authorities intrusted with the regulation of
such matters, and not the courts, are primarily
the judges of the necessities of local situations
calling for such legislation, and the courts may
only interfere with laws or ordinances passed
in pursuance of the police power where they are
arbitrary
to forbe
palpably
unmistakably
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in excess of any reasonable exercise of the authority conferred.''
And in further holding that the restrictions imposed
by local law did not interfere with interstate commerce
stated:
''Public notice of the presence of its agents in
the town for the purpose of taking orders for
appellee's goods could be given stating when and
where such agents could be found, samples of its
wares seen, and their use explained and demonstrated, and orders taken.''
Also see Packer Corporation v. St,ate of Utah, 285
U.S. 52.
In the case of Savage v. Janes, 225 U.S. 501, 56
L. Ed. 1182, the court said :
''The state cannot, under cover of exerting its
police powers, undertake what amounts essentially to a regulation of interstate commerce, or impose a direct burden upon that commerce. But
when the local police regulation has real relation
to the suitable protection of the people of the
state, and is reasonable in its requirements, it is
not invalid because it may incidentally affect interstate commerce.''
In the case of Internatiowal Text Book Oo. v. City
of Auburn, 155 Fed. 986, the court said:
''An ordinance prohibiting the distribution
of handbills, etc., in the public streets on the
ground, among others, that it controlled annoy-
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ing methods of interfering with persons traveling therein, is valid and should be upheld. Laws
prescribing a punishment for those who engage
in the temporary business of vending within a
certain distance of camp meetings or fairs without the consent of those in charge of the said
meetings or fairs have been sustained as reasonable police regulations on the ground that they
are intended to prevent disturbances.'' State v.
Reynolds, 58 Atl. 755~ )!eyers v. Baker, 12 N. E.
79.
In the case of Commi.ssion v. Gardner, 19 Atl. 554,
148 U.S. 774, the court upheld the validity of a statute
prohibiting the sale of foreign and domestic goods, wares
and merchandise in a specified county by any person
or persons as hawker or peddler, the court reasoning
that there can be no interference with inter-state commerce by legislation which erects no barrier at the state
line, such regulation being merely a police regulation
applicable to all persons whether non-residents or not.
In the case of Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79,
54 L. Ed. 673, the court upheld the validity of a state
law prohibiting drumming and soliciting business for
patronage upon railroad trains and premises of common
carriers. Also see Ex. Parte Hogg, 156 S. W. 931.
IV. SECTION 3652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, IS
NOT VOID FOR WANT OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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!NATION OR PROPER AND LAWFUL CLASSIFICATION.
Appellant takes the position that because the city
permits the sale of newspapers upon the str.eets within
the district in which the subscription to magazines is
prohibited by ordinance, ·the said ordinance is arbitrary,
capricious and provides for unlawful classification. The
Utah Supreme Court has passed upon the question of
proper and permitted classification in the case of Br>o,adb.ent, 1et. al. v. Gibson, a Utah case, 140 Pac. 2d 939.
In determining whether or not this classification is
unconstitutional, it must be remembered that discrimination is the very essence of classification and is not objectionable unless founded upon distinetions which the
court is compelled to find unreasonable. St,ate v. Mason,
94 Utah 501. 78 Pac. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330.
The legislature has a wide discretion in determining
what shall come within the class of permitted activities
and what shall be excluded. Kolman v. St. Lo~uis, 289
S. W. 838; Stewart Uotor Co. v. Oity of Omaha, 235
N.W. 332; State v. Dolmw, 13 Ida. 693, 92 Pac. 995.
The court is not concerned with the wisdom or
policy of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for
·that of the legislative body. If reasonable minds might
differ as to reasonableness of the regulation, the law
must be upheld. Niebbia v. People, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.
Ed. 940.
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The Illinois Supreme Court has passed directly on
this question in the case of Oi'ty of Chicago v. Rhirne,
supra., a 1936 cas.e in which case the court said in discussing the objections to permitting the sale of newspapers and prohibiting ·the sale of magazines within a
restricted district and the lack of reason in establishing
restricted zones :
"The defendant contends that the ordinance
is unreasonable in that (1) there is no sufficient
legal reason why the ordinance should permit the
sale of daily newspapers and prohibit the sale of
magazines within the restricted territory; and
(2) that there is no substantial basis for designating either of the two prohibited areas in which
commerce cannot be carried on freely.
(7) It is a matter of common knowledge that
the loop and the Wilson avenue districts are
severally highly congested areas for travel and
transportation, and of this fact we take judicial
notice. 23 Corpus Juris, Sec. 1992, p. 165. It doubtless was the thought of the municipal authorities
that the indiscriminate sale of articles of merchandise upon the streets in the prohibited territory tended to impede, delay, and obstruct traffic, thereby impairing the legitimate use of the
streets. The hampering of traffic movement in
the congested areas was a problem presented to
the municipal authorities for solution. They were
not concerned with the fact that withdrawal of the
use of such streets for private gain by street
vendors and peddlers might possibly work a
hardship in individual cases on those engaged in
such commercial pursuits, but realizing it was the
city's
obligation to arrive at, as nearly as might
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be, a practical remedy for the relief of the unfavorable travel situation in those streets, overburdened with traffic, the municipal authorities determined upon this ordinance as an appropriate
legal remedy.
(8-11) It is our duty in passing upon the
reasonableness of the ordinance to consider the
circumstances and conditions existing at the time
of its passage and the evils sought to be corrected. Biffer v. City of Chicago, supra. Even
though we might not agree with the judgment of
the municipal body in the passage of such ordinance and think it oppressive, yet if it was within the powers granted the municipality we have
no right to disturb the ordinance (Metropolis
Theater Co. v. City of Chi,cago, 246 Ill. 20, 92
N. E. 597, affirmed in 228 U. S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441,
57 L. Ed. 730) unless it is clearly unreasonable.
City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N. E.
537. It is not within the province of the judiciary
to set up its judgment as to the necessity and
appropriateness of the legislative act so long as
the same may not clearly be unreasonable. Ferguson Coal Co. v. Thompson, supra; Dorwart v.
City of Jacksonville, 333 Ill. 143,164 N.E.129;
Melton v. City of Paris, 333 Ill. 190, 164 N. E.
218. Under the special circumstances existing in
the loop and the Wilson avenue areas it was not
necessary that the ordinance apply to all portions
of the city. City of Chicago v. McKinley, supra;
Ferguson Coal Co. v. Thompson, supra; Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E.
79; People v. Keir, 78 Mich. 98, 43 N. W. 1039.
(12, 13) The defendant earnestly insists
that because the ordinance permits the sale of
daily newspapers within the prohibited districts
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taking up this phase of the case we should glance
for the moment at the position of the defendant
who is attarking the ronstitutionality of the ordinance. He is seeking to carry out his own private
commercial enterprise for his own personal financial profit, on the streets within the loop district,
one of the forbidden domains. Although he may
haYe, prior to the passage of the ordinance, pursued his calling on the streets, his use thereof
was solely a permissive one. He had no inherent
right to operate his business in or upon the streets
of the city. People v. Thompson, supra; People
v. \V olper, 350 Ill. 461, 183 N. E. 451; People v.
Clean Street Co., 225 Ill. 479, 80 N. E. 298, 9
L. R. A. (N.S.) 455, 116 Am. St. Rep. 156; Wade
v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 256, 46 S. W. 668;
Rosa v. City of Portland, 86 Or. 438, 168 P. 936,
L. R. A. 1918 B, 851; Greene v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. 'W. 6; West v. City
of Waco, 116 Tex. 472, 294 S. W. 832. That some
one else is given the privilege of selling newspapers (a commodity not within the same class
as the article the defendant was exposing for and
offering for sale) did not constitute an unconstitutional discrimination against him. The classification made by the city by which daily newspapers were exempt from the operation of the
ordinance was valid. People v. Thompson, supra;
Rosa v. City of Portland, supra; Philadelphia v.
Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 A. 374, 58 L. R. A. 220.
(14, 15) Nor does the ordinance run counter to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States nor to the cited sections
of the State Constitution. The ordinance affected
all persons engaged in the same business equally
under like conditions. Churchill v. Albany, 65
Or. 442, 133 P. 632, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1094. Nor
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did the ordinance offend against the equality provision of the Constitution. The equality of enjoyment is not within the constitutional guaranty.
Such guaranty does not mean that a legislative
act will operate alike upon all citizens. The equality of right is the equality guaranty."
The case of Rosa v. City of Portland, 168 Pac. 936,
held that a city ordinance imposing license taxes on
peddlers in the city streets except venders of newspapers,
farm produce, etc., does not deprive dealers in popcorn,
fruits, etc., of any privileg.e or immunity in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, since the right to use city streets is not inherent
but may be limited or prohibited.
Also see People v. Finkelst.ein, 9 N. Y. Sup. 2d 941,
wherein it was held that newspapers and magazines
were a proper classification as against other merchandise.
It should also be noted that the case of City of Chicago v. Rhine, sup.na, as does the weight of authority,
provide that the court may take judicial notice of the
congested district or districts within the city.
V. THE MERE LAX ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION H652 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1944, BY RESPONDENTS
IS NOT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN
A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE.
It was admitted by respondents in the hearing on
demurrer that the ordinance was not enforced against
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the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses in the distribution or sale of religious literature, the great weight of
authority being to the effect that cities do not have the
power or right to prohibit or suppress the distribution
or sale of religious literature upon its streets or in public
places, but does have the power to impose reasonable
regulations thereon.
In the case of City .of Blue Island v. Kozul, 41 N. E.
2d 515, the court held that a ci·ty ordinance requiring
peddlers selling or offering for sale goods, wares or
merchandise to obtain a license and paying license fees
as applied to sale and distribution of magazines and
leaflets by a member of Jehovah's Witnesses who distributed the literature as part of her form of worship
without financial gain or material profit to herself and
not as a means of livelihood is unconstitutional and a
violation of the right of freedom of speech and of freedom of the press. The Rhine case, supr:a, was ref·erred
to and pointed out as an exception to the rule in this
case and the case of Schneider v. Irving~~on, supr:a.
The case of Hamnan vs. Oity of Haverhill, 120 Fed.
2d 87, was a case involving distribution of books and
leaflets by Jehovah's Witnesses on the city streets and
the court held :
''The constitutional liberties of a citizen to
use streets for purposes of assembly and the interchange of thought on religious, political and
other matters are relative not absolute and must
be exercised in subordination to the comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peace and
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good order. A state or municipality may by general and not non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, places and manner of soliciting
upon its streets and of holding meetings thereon
and may, in other respects, safeguard the peace,
good order and comfort of the community without
unconstitutional liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the regulations must be
appropriate to subject matter regulated.''
Also see 175 S. W. 2d 21. Also see Saia v. People
of the State of New York, supra, a case involving the
use of a loud speaker in public places by Jehovah's
Witnesses.
All of the above cases establish the rule that the
distributing or selling religious literature is not in the
sam.e class as the selling of magazines or books as a
private business for personal gain and that a different
rule exists for each. The city of Salt Lake City has
heretofore arrested members of the Jehovah's Witnesses'
religious sect for distributing their literature and other
publications and selling the sam·e on our public streets
and the trial courts have repeatedly held that the city's
power with relation to such religious sects is merely
that of regulation and not of suppression as is the rule
with a private business being conducted on a public
street for personal gain. Nor does appellant contend in
support of his position that the city permits other magazine salesmen, who sell for private gain, or salesmen
who sell other commodities within the same class as
magazines for private gain, to sell their magazines, wares
or other commodities upon the public streets of Salt
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Lake City with impunity, while at the same time prosecuting appellant for such activity.
The city at the time of the hearing on demurre·r,
for the purpose of argument, admitted the sale of tickets
to centennial events such as rodeos and musicals from
a booth located at 2nd South and Main Str·eets in Salt
Lake City, but contended and does again contend that
such activities are not in the same class as selling magazines or goods, wares or merchandise, the sale of which
are prohibited by the provisions of Section 3652 of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, and
that such exceptions as are made in said ordinance are
proper classifications within the power of the city legislative body to create and establish by ordinance, based
on the existing facts then before and considered by them
at the time of adopting such ordinance.
Let us assume, however, for the purpose of argument that the appellant is right in his contention that
the city has been lax in the enforcement of certain provisions of Section 3652 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944.
The cases cited by him such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 30 L. Ed. 220; Glicke.r v. Michigan Liquor
Control Commiss!ion, 160 Fed. 2d 96, ar.e not in point
for they are cases where a discretion was delegated to
city officials by ordinance in granting or denying a
license to do business and in each case the court held
that an arbitrary refusal to grant the license to '"'""one
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person when it was granted to others in like positions
and under similar circumstances was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The case of Wade v. City and County of 8wn. Francisco, 186 Pac. 2d 181, holds that the city in that case
was deliberately and intentionally permitting some to
sell magazine subscriptions while prohibiting others from
selling magazine subscriptions in the same places and
under similar circumstances.
Appellant made no allegations in his complaint alleging that the city was intentionally or deliberately
permitting others to sell or solicit the sale of magazines
for personal gain in the r-estricted area as prescribed
by Section 3652 of the city ordinances or that the city
had a discretion in permitting such sales, which discretion was being arbitrarily employed.
We agree with the trial court in its memorandum
opinion that the city fathers hav,e no right to permit
any person to violate the law but the authorities hold
that the mere lax enforcement of a law or ordinance
violates no constitutional right.
The Wade oas,e, sup'fia, also holds tha:t where mere
laxity of enforcement, although it may result in the unequal application of the law to those who are entitled
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection
in the constitutional sense, it must be shown that there
was an intentional discrimination, which of course must
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be pleaded. Dillon on IJ!unicipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
Sec. 327 states as follows:
'' \Yhether or not a municipal ordinance is
discriminating, must be determined by the court
as a question of law from the provisions of the
ordinance itself and not from the manner of its
enforcement.''
In the case of City ·of Denver v. Gira.r:d, 42 Pac. 662,
the court said :
''The ordinance in question is not void because it conflicts with a prior ordinance relating
to the same subject, and it is equally clear that
it is not unreasonable merely because the municipal authorities have been lax in impartially enforcing it, or had not, at the time of the trial,
instituted suits against other violators of its provisions.''
Also see Sylvartia v. Hilton, 51 S. W. 744, 2 L.R.A.
N.S. 483, wherein the court said:
''If the meaning of an ordinance is plain
and unambiguous, the fact that it may have been
repeatedly violated without objection on the part
of the municipal officers will not alter its meaning, or furnish any defense to one who afterwards
violates it."
CONCLUSION

The complaint of the appellant fails to staie facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the order
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of the trial court in sustaining the g,eneral demurrer,
and its further order dismissing the complaint of appellant should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
C~try Att;orrney,
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistarn.t City Attorneys.
Attorneys for Respondents.
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